We characterize the evolution over time of a credit network as a system of coupled stochastic processes, each one of which describes the dynamics of individual financial robustness. The coupling comes from the connectivity of the network, since each agents' financial robustness is associated with the financial robustness of the partners through risk sharing, distress propagation and the bankruptcy cascade effects. In this framework we consider the effects of a shock to a specific node as network connectivity increases. Under specific conditions we detect the emergence of a trade off between decreasing individual risk -due to risk sharing -and increasing systemic risk -due to the propagation of financial distress. The larger the number of connected neighbors, the smaller the risk of an individual collapse but the higher systemic risk. In other words, in our paper, the relationship between connectivity and systemic risk is not monotonically decreasing as usually found in the literature. Risk sharing by itself would lead systemic risk to zero as the connectivity increases. Distress propagation and the bankruptcy cascade effect, together with trend reinforcement -i.e. the fact that individual financial fragility feeds back on itself-may amplify the effect of the initial shock and lead to a full fledged systemic crisis if they more than offset risk sharing.
Introduction

Credit Networks
Credit is pervasive in modern economies. Credit relationships establish connections among commercial banks on the interbank market, among firms and banks on the market for loans, among customers and suppliers on the market for trade credit. In other words, many markets for credit can be conceived of as credit networks in which nodes represent agents and links represent credit relationships. Because of the risk of insolvency, the extension of credit is conditional upon the assessment of credit worthiness and the establishment of a trust relationship between a borrower and a lender. This requires time and effort -there are non-negligible transaction costs in credit markets -so that an agent is willing to trade only with few other agents: Credit networks are generally incomplete. An influential example of network analysis applied to credit networks is the seminal paper by Allen and Gale (2001) on "financial contagion" on the interbank market 1 . Boissay (2006) and Battiston et al. (2007) focus on the trade-credit relationships among downstream and upstream firms along the "supply chain". In the most general setting, one can even conceive the macroeconomy as a credit network consisting of households, firms and banks.
Establishing several credit relationships allows an agent to carry on an investment project which would not be feasible by means of internal financial resources alone and to diversify the risk of a loss (or of a credit crunch) if the agent is hit by a negative shock, but it also entails the propagation of financial distress to connected agents in a credit network, i.e. financial contagion in the wording of Allen and Gale. In this context, in principle one cannot rule out the risk of a systemic crisis, i.e. not only of the diffusion but also of the amplification of financial distress until the collapse of the financial system. Each one of the interdependent agents, in fact, is susceptible to go bankrupt so that the network is potentially exposed to the risk of a systemic failure, i.e. of multiple joint bankruptcies.
Contagion Channels
The most recent strand of research has focused on three types of propagation of financial distress: (a) self-fulfilling panic (bank runs) (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) ; (b) depreciation of a common asset (asset price contagion) (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) , (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2002) ; (c) interlocking credit exposure (financial contagion) (Allen and Gale, 2001) , (Allen and Gale, 2005) . These three mechanisms represent independent but not alternative contagion channels which may interact during the development of a financial crisis. For instance, a run on a bank is a shock which may trigger at the same time an avalanche of deposit withdrawals at other banks -i.e a propagation mechanism of type (a) -and a phenomenon of financial contagion and liquidity evaporation on the interbank market -i.e. a propagation mechanism of type (c).
Focusing on the last channel, in their pioneering contribution Allen and Gale reach the conclusion that if the credit network of the interbank market is a credit chainin which each agent is linked only to one neighbor along a ring -the probability of a collapse of each and every agent (a bankruptcy avalanche) in case a node is hit by a shock is equal to one. As the number of partners of each agent increases, i.e. as the network evolves toward completeness, the risk of a collapse of the agent hit by the shock goes asymptotically to zero, thanks to risk sharing. The larger the pool of connected neighbors whom the agent can share the shock with, the smaller the risk of a collapse of the agent and therefore of the network, i.e. the higher network resilience. Systemic risk is at a minimum when the credit network is complete, i.e. when agents fully diversify individual risks. In other words, there is a monotonically decreasing relationship between the probability of individual failure/systemic risk and the degree of connectivity of the credit network.
In the present paper we adopt the same perspective of Allen and Gale, i.e. we focus on interlinkages of credit exposures in a general framework for the analysis of credit networks. We are much less optimistic, however, on the effects of connectivity on systemic risk because, as the former increases, under specific conditions we detect the emergence of a trade off between decreasing individual risk -due to risk sharing -and increasing systemic risk -due to the propagation of financial distress. The larger the number of connected neighbors, the smaller the risk of an individual collapse but the higher systemic risk may be and therefore the lower network resilience. In other words, in our paper, the relationship between connectivity and systemic risk is not monotonically decreasing as in Allen and Gale, but hump shaped, i.e. decreasing for relatively low degree of connectivity and increasing afterwards. In particular we find that as degree of connectivity increases above a given value, crises tend to be not only more severe, but also more frequent.
Interdependence and Trend Reinforcement
This remarkable result which is at odd with many previous works, results from the simple superposition of two mechanisms, namely the interdependence of financial robustness of agents and the trend reinforcement. The first mechanism, which is also present in several models, from (Allen and Gale, 2001) to (Shin, 2008) consists in the fact that the financial robustness of an agent (as measured for instance by its equity ratio) is affected by the financial robustness of its neighbors and thus depends on the position of the agent in the network of contracts. Such interdependence is a general mechanism when credit relations are involved. For instance, if A lends to B, then the financial robustness of B affects the asset value of A and thus A's robustness. A similar dependence can also stem from an insurance contract. Consider the case in which B sells protection to A against the loss of value of a security X. If the value of X decreases and in addition B is under stress then A's robustness is affected because there are chances that B cannot deliver the protection she promised.
The second mechanism which we consider in our model reflects the fact that the temporal evolution of financial robustness is intrinsically subject to positive feedbacks. In other words, the financial distress to an agent in the present period is likely to lead to additional financial distress in the future and viceversa. Such a trend reinforcement is also quite a general mechanism in credit networks. It can occur in at least two situations. In the first one (see e.g. in (Morris and Shin, 2008) ), consider an agent A that is hit by a shock due a loss in value of some securities among her assets. If such shock is large enough, so that some of A's creditors claim their funds back, A is forced to fire-sell some of the securities in order to pay the debt. If the securities are sold below the market price, the asset side of the balance sheet is decreasing more than the liability side and the leverage of A is unintentionally increased. This situation can lead to a spiral of losses and decreasing robustness (Brunnermeier, 2008; Brunnermeier and Pederson, 2009) . A second situation is the one in which when the agent A is hit by a shock, her creditor B makes condition to credit harder in the next period. Indeed it is well documented that lenders ask a higher external finance premium when the borrowers' financial conditions worsen (Bernanke et al., 1999) . This can be seen as a cost from the point of view of A and thus as an additional shock hitting A in the next period. In both situations, a decrease in robustness at period t increases the chance of a decrease in robustness at period t + 1.
The interplay of interdependence and trend reinforcement of financial robustness has not been modeled so far in a dynamic model, although the idea is present in several previous works (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003, e.g. 140-141) . Suppose, for instance, that agent A is hit by an adverse shock which makes her financial condition more fragile. Her lenders -say B and C -will absorb part of the shock and experience therefore a decrease of their own financial robustness (interdependence). As a consequence, they will be less willing to extend credit at the same terms as before, thus rationing the quantity of external financing made available or increasing the interest rate charged to A. In other words credit will be extended at less favorable conditions making the financial position of A even worse: Financial fragility feeds back on itself at the individual level (trend reinforcement). Furthermore, A is in turn linked as a lender to other agents -say D and E. Being in financial distress, A will restrain credit or charge a higher interest rate to her borrowers, making their financial conditions worse (interdependence again). The increasing of financial fragility therefore spreads through the credit network, a phenomenon often called distress propagation.
Bankruptcy Cascades
An initial shock may or may not force A into bankruptcy. If the agent is financially robust, she can absorb the shock and its consequences -in particular the increase in the external finance premium -without going bankrupt. The agent, however, will be financially more fragile and more vulnerable in case a new shock occurs. If A is not "robust enough" she will go bankrupt 2 and exit, there will be a loss of "organizational capital" (in Howitt's wording) and a fall out on her partners, who will face a loss and/or incur an additional cost. The lenders (i.e. B and C) will face a loss because they will not recover the loans they extended to the bankrupt agent. The borrowers (i.e. D and E) will incur a cost because they will have to look somewhere else for credit and establish a new relation of trust with a new lender. This is an instance of transaction costs on the credit market.
3 These additional losses and costs may force some others agents into bankruptcy, and trigger a bankruptcy cascade.
All in all, the three mechanisms of interdependence, trend reinforcement and bankruptcy cascades can be conceived of in the most general terms as externalities. In case of a negative shock to an agent, they result in additional costs to the other nodes in the neighborhood. Distress propagation is a consequence of the dependencies among the financial robustness of the agents, which by itself is not positive nor negative. Indeed, the dependency could result also in an increase in robustness of an agent, if the robustness of her partners increases. In particular, in the absence of the other mechanisms, the probability of individual bankruptcy will tend to zero (and so will the probability of a systemic crisis) as the connectivity and the size of the network increases. Trend reinforcement is a negative externality, since it results from the reaction of the partners of an agent to its recent negative trend of robustness. Finally, bankruptcy cascades are also a negative externality because they result from the fact that the robustness of the agent decreases when one ore more of her partners goes bankrupt. Together, the three mechanisms may amplify the effect of the initial shock and lead to a full fledged systemic crisis if they more than offset the benefit of risk sharing. In other words a systemic crisis may originate in a single node of the network due to financial contagion and the positive feedback mechanism. It is not necessarily associated to an aggregate economy-wide shock.
Significance of the Work
In a broader perspective, this conceptual framework may have far reaching implications also for the assessment of the costs and benefits of globalization. Since some credit relations involve agents located in different countries, national credit networks are connected in a world wide web of credit relationships. The increasing interlinkage of credit networks -one of the main features of globalization -allows for international risk sharing but it also makes room for the propagation of financial distress across borders. The recent, and still ongoing, financial crisis is a case in point.
International risk sharing may prevail in the early stage of globalization, i.e. when connectivity is relatively "low". An increase in connectivity at this stage therefore may be beneficial. On the other hand, if connectivity is already high, i.e. in the mature stage of globalization, an increase in connectivity may bring to the fore the internationalization of financial distress. An increase in connectivity, in other words, may increase the likelihood of financial crises worldwide.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a simple model of the evolution of individual financial robustness. Section 3 is devoted to a definition of the issues we want to investigate, i.e. the probability of bankruptcy and systemic risk. In sections 4 we present the baseline scenario, in which only risk sharing and the distress propagation effects are considered. In section 5 we consider the additional effect of trend reinforcement and in section 6 we examine the implications of the bankruptcy cascade effect. Section 7 concludes.
The General Model
In this section we derive a minimal dynamic model of the financial robustness of individual agents connected in a network of credit relationships. This formulation of the model includes both the mechanisms of interdependence and trend reinforcement, while the bankruptcy cascade mechanism will be introduced in Section 3. Similarly to (Hull and White, 2001 ), financial robustness of agent i is meant here as an indicator of the agent creditworthyness or distance to default, and denoted as ρ i ∈ [0, 1], with ρ i = 0 indicating bankruptcy. We obtain a system of stochastic differential equations describing the evolution in time of all the ρ i . The interest of this approach is that it is then possible to derive some results on the expected first passage time at 0 and thus on the probability of default of an agent even taking into account the dynamics of the other agents. although on the basis of some analytical approximations. The SDE approach allows to include in a natural way the first two mechanisms mentioned in the Introduction, namely the interdependence of the robustness and the trend reinforcement and to investigate the effect of their interplay for systemic risk.
Before going into the details of the model, we describe the network and the related definitions that will be relevant in the following. We consider a set of n agents connected in a network of financial contracts. Formally the relations in the network are described by a graph G = (V, E), where V is a set of nodes representing the agents and E is a set of directed edges representing the contracts. The graph is associated with an adjacency matrix A where A ij = 0 if there is no edge from i to j and A ij = 1 if there is an edge from i to j -meaning that agent i owns liabilities of j. The correspondence of the direction of the edge to the direction of the financial tie is a matter of convention, of course, and does not affect the results. This choice turns out to be more convenient for our computations. The graph is also associated with a weight matrix W where W ij ∈ [0, 1], with the same 0 entries of A. For our purposes W is a row-stochastic matrix ( j W ij = 1, ∀i) where W ij represents the exposure of i to j relative to i portfolio of exposures. The out-degree of node i is the number k i of out-going edges of node i and represents the number of counterparties or neighbors to which agent i is exposed.
We are interested in the situation in which the exposures in the portfolio of each agent are approximately balanced, i.e. W ij ∼ 1 k i so that the degree of the node i is a rough measure of the risk diversification of the agent (we are not considering the optimization of the portfolio over time, therefore this measure will suffice for our the results we aim to show). The ratio of the number ℓ of existing edges among nodes over the number of all possible edges n(n − 1) is the density d of the network, d = ℓ n(n−1)
. It represents the fraction of possible pairs of agents that are involved in a financial contract. A simple relation of proportionality holds between the the average degree k in the network and the density [CITE textbook 
(for n in the range we are interested in). Thus for a fixed number n of agents, the density of the network is also measure of the average risk diversification across the agents. In the following we characterize the systemic risk of the credit network for varying levels of k or equivalently varying levels of average risk diversification.
Interdependence of Financial Robustness
The first assumption concerns the dependence of financial robustness of an agent on the robustness of the agents connected with her by some contract. As in the models of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Shin (2008) , we consider a set of agents connected in a network of obligations. We denote as K ij the asset held by i and related to j. To be concrete, let us think of this as a liability of agent j to i (are other relevant situations were mentioned in Section ??. Then, the value of K ij depends on ability of j to meet the obligation and thus on her financial robustness. We assume that the value of the asset is proportional to the robustness of the debtor,
is the nominal value of the contract. The value of total assets of i at a given time is determined based on the estimate of robustness already available,
where K 0 i is the capital invested in the assets and W ij are the fractions of capital i has invested in each contract. We have j W ij = 1 and W ij measures the relative initial value of the debt of j for i. In case j is not able to meet her obligation, W ji is the relative loss of i with respect to her initial investment. Notice that this may differ from the loss with respect to the current value of the assets. If the returns on the various assets do not differ too much, or one consider periods of time that are not too long, W ij is a reasonable proxy of the relative impact on i's asset due to a change in robustness of j.
Since i's capital depends on the robustness of the neighbours, so does equity E i and equity ratio
where L i is total liability of i. In particular, at constant L i equity ratio increases with increasing robustness and viceversa, as we can see from the first derivative of equity of i with respect to ρ j :
Deriving a law of motion of interdependent equity ratios would be a a very desirable achievement, but it requires to make a number of assumptions on the decisions agents make regarding what target leverage they aim at, what assets they may sell, what reactions they have on changes in the robustness of their counterparties. Our aim here is more modest. Motivated by Eq. (2), we make the assumption that, in absence of bankruptcies, robustness values are simply linearly dependent and we explore the consequences for systemic risk of such an assumption in a dynamic setting. We thus write
where we assume that robustness is subject to idiosynchratic identically distributed shocks.
Since the liabilities of agent j are held by other agents, the idiosynchratic shock hitting j is shared with the connected agents proportionally to the relative weight of their financial exposure to j. Moreover, the shock hitting agent i affects i herself only proportionally to the term W ii , while she is affected by the shock hitting the neighbors. The change in time of robustness is then
Passing now to the limit of continuous time and assuming idiosyncratic shocks to be drawn from a normal distribution, we obtain a linear stochastic differential equation (SDE) [CITE textbook]:
where dξ j (t) denotes the Wiener process. Notice that Eq. (3) implies that the robustness of an agent is not the result of a simultaneous computation of robustness of all agents. Instead, it is affected by the change in robustness of the neighbours at the previous period. This is similar to what happens in the professional practice of financial rating. The rating of an institution is revised after the occurrence of events regarding the capital structure of the agent herself or the agents to which she is exposed. Bankruptcy occurs when robustness falls below a given threshold, which we model, as usual, as a lower absorbing barrier. Therefore, the agent goes bankrupt when robustness hits the lower barrier and is replaced by a new agent, with a new initial value of robustness. We assume that increasing financial robustness has an opportunity cost for the agent, so that she has no incentive to increase robustness indefinitely. For the sake of simplicity, we model this by assuming that robustness cannot exceed an upper barrier at ρ i = 1.
Trend reinforcement
What we call trend reinforcement, i.e. the fact that the robustness of the firms depends on the history of the robustness itself, is an important feature of a credit network that we would like to include in our model. In particular, we want to model the fact that if the robustness of the agent has gone down in the recent past, partners apply tighter credit conditions and robustness decreases even further. For the sake of simplicity, we cut short the history of robustness to the indicators at times t and t − t ′ , with t ′ ≥ 0. A straightforward way to model trend reinforcement within the framework of an SDE is to introduce an additional term in the drift with a time delay dependency. To remain general, we consider a function h(ρ(t), ρ(t − t ′ ). The law of motion of robustness becomes
With the last addition the law of motion becomes a set of time-delayed stochastic differential equations, for which no general analytical solution is known. However, as we will show in the next section, when the functional form of h is specified, it may be possible to remove the time delay via an analytical approximation and obtain again a regular SDE.
Relation to Literature in Finance
According to the standard approach in finance the valuation of corporate liabilities of a firm is related to a first passage problem in a stochastic diffusion process ( (Merton, 1974) , (Black and Cox, 1976) . The asset value is assumed to evolve over time as an SDE with a lower absorbing barrier, so that the firm defaults when asset value becomes zero or hits from above a positive threshold (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995) . When several firms are considered, the structural models (Hull and White, 2001; Zhou, 1997) assume that the diffusive terms of the different firms bear some mutual correlation. In particular, Hull and White (2001) have introduced a credit index describing the creditworthiness of the firm. The credit indices of different firms evolve as correlated stochastic processes with zero drift, but with an absorbing barrier that is time dependent and specific to each firm. In this way the authors are able to compute numerically the probability of default of large numbers of firms. Differently from those works in finance, our aim here is not to value corporate liabilities. Instead, we aim at understanding the interplay of interdependence and trend reinforcement in situations of systemic risk. In this paper, we will restrict our focus on the case of drift and diffusion which are independent of the state variable ρ. However, it is possible to try and extend the results along the lines of the stochastic capital theory introduced in (Brock et al., 1989) .
Analysis of a Specific Model
In order to analyze the implications of this model, we need to specify some of its components. First of all, we need to specify the structure of the credit network. We assume that this is a regular graph, i.e. each agent has the same number k of partners. We need also to specify function h in Equation (6) 
The Trend reinforcement
For the function h we assume that the time delay is small, t ′ = dt and we adopt the following definition.
The parameters ǫ and α represent, respectively, the sensitivity and the amplitude of the reaction of the neighbours of i to a decrease in her robustness. The definition above implies that the neighbors of i react only when an adverse shock to i is large enough to cause a negative variation of robustness that exceed, in absolute value, ǫ times the standard deviation of the shocks (which is σ/ √ k)). When the neighbors do react, the reaction causes a decrease of magnitude α in the i − th robustness (because of the additional costs imposed to i by the neighbors, as explained in the Introduction).
Notice that, defined as such, the value of h at time t is independent from the realization of the Wiener process at the same time t. In fact,
, in the definition of h, depends on the realization of the Wiener process dz at times t − dt and t − 2dt. Whether h equals −α or not obviously depends on the amplitude, σ/ √ k, of the noise and on the parameters ǫ and α. However, we can conceive h(t) as a stochastic variable that is independent of dz at time t, and that is equal to −α with a certain probability, say q. The average value over time of the variable h is then −αq, which corresponds to a constant negative drift. Since we are interested in the average first passage time of our system, we model the trend reinforcement simply as a constant drift term and rewrite Equation (6) as follows
Notice that q depends on the degree of diversification k. The expression of the probability q will be given in Section 2.3.3.
Variance of robustness across agents
Since the evolution of robustness in Eq. (8) is described by a linear system, the distribution p(ρ i (t) of the values of robustness of a given node i across different realizations of the process is gaussian Gardiner (2004) [CITE textbook on stochastic systems too]. We cannot say the same for the probability distribution p(ρ, t) of the values of robustness across nodes in a given realization at a given time. The two distribution are not the same a priori. However, via the Ito lemma one can derive a scalar SDE for the variance v(t) = j (ρ j (t) −ρ(t)) 2 /N of the robustness across the nodes at any time 4 . Under some mild condition 5 the expected value of the variance tends exponentially fast over time to the value
). Therefore, a part from the correction term − k N due to the combination of shocks, the variance of the robustness across agents coincides with the variance of the shocks at the individual agents. Over time the trajectories of ρ i (t) at the different nodes evolve more and more closely as k increases. Based on the discussion above, it is reasonable to assume that over time the distribution of robustness across agents can be approximated by a gaussian with variance σ/sqrt(k).
Results on Failure Probability
In this section we analyze the impact of interdependence and trend reinforcment on the probability of bankruptcy. In a nutshell, we find that, in the absence of trend reinforcement, the diversification of individual risk (not surprisingly) always yields a reduction of systemic risk. In contrast, as soon as we include trend reinforcement, this is not necessarily true. Trend reinforcement generates a negative drift in the stochastic trajectory of the robustness that more than offsets the positive effect of diversification. The probability of individual bankruptcy can be investigated in terms of the first passage time of the SDE and it is possible to compute analytically the mean passage time at 0 and hence the probability of bankruptcy.
The probability P f that at any given time t an agent goes bankrupt is the expected frequency with which, over time, the robustness of the agent hits the bankruptcy threshold. Since frequency is the inverse of the time between successive events, the probability of bankruptcy can be measured as the inverse of the mean first passage time, T f , of the stochastic process describing the evolution of the robustness, P f = 1 T f .
Proposition 1.
1. In absence of trend reinforcement (h = 0), the probability of bankruptcy of the individual agent decreases with the degree of risk diversification k as P f (k) = σ 2 k .
2. In the presence of trend reinforcement, the average probability of bankruptcy P f of an agent depends on the average degree of risk diversification as follows
where Φ is the cumulated distribution function of the gaussian.
5 The graph has to be primitive and not too sparse.
3. In particular, the probability of bankruptcy P f has a minimum.
The first result stated in the proposition is due to the fact that in absence of trend reinforcement the evolution of the robustness can be approximated with a Brownian motion. In this case, the mean first passage time through an absorptive barrier is inversely proportional to the variance of the random steps. This implies the intuitive result that the probability of bankruptcy decreases with the average number of counterparties. In other words in absence of trend reinforcement, the credit network is more stable the larger is the number of contracts among agents. This results is in line with the classical result of (Allen and Gale, 2001) . Figure 1 : Illustration of the dependency of the failure probability P f on the diversification degree k. In the baseline (dashed line) the probability decreases inversely proportional to k. In contrast, in presence of trend reinforcement (thick continuous line) of the form of Equation (7) For the second and third result, the dependence of q from k is shown in Figure 1 . The light continuous curve corresponds to the drift term αq(k). This means that in the stochastic process of Equation (8) the drift is negligible for small k, becomes important for large k and tends to a finite asymptotic value for k → ∞. The mean first passage time of a stochastic process in presence of both a reflective and an absorbing barrier can be computed with standard approaches (Gardiner, 2004) The result is that we can write a general expression for the probability of failure P f (k) and that this function has one minimum as a function of k. This implies that risk diversification becomes at some point counterproductive and increases the probability of failure, something which is now at odd with the result of (Allen and Gale, 2001 ).
This counterintuitive result depends obviously on the fact that the trend reinforcement mechanism generates a drift. How general is this result? Let us emphasize again that we did not assume how the drift varies with k, but that we obtained as a result of the interaction of the agents in a network. It is an emerging property.
The crucial assumption for that to be true is that the reaction of the counterparties of an agent has constant size α while the amplitude of the observed signal (the fluctuations of the shared shocks on robustness) is σ/ (k) which decreases with k. The generality of the result depends on the generality of this assumption. Now, there is not much to question about risk diversification decreasing the fluctuation amplitude. About the amplitude of the reaction there is instead more room for objections. One could model the amplitude of the reaction to a large decrease in robustness of i as a function of ρ i . For instance, the reaction α(ρ i ) could be small if i is still financially robust and become larger when her situation deteriorates. This would tend to delay the onset of the trend reinforcement and hence to shift the minimum of the curve of P f (k) to the right.
While it is possible to argue that the reaction of counterparty involves actions of discrete nature which cannot be tuned to the size of the signal, a final word on this issue requires an empirical validation.
Bankruptcy Cascades
In the previous section we have analysed the case in which the robustness of a firm is affected over time by the change in robustness of the connected firms. In this section we analyze the case in which, in addition, at the moment of the bankruptcy of a neighbor, the agent is further affected negatively, due to organizational loss or other effects, as discussed in Section 1.0.4. If the agent is in turn pushed into bankruptcy, this can trigger a cascade process in which bankrutptcies generated more bankruptcies. This is commonly referred to as domino effect.
We want to model the fact that the bankruptcy of a firm has a negative impact on the robustness of the counterparties. Similar perspective has been investigated by (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001) in interbank credit networks and by (?) in trade credit networks. More recently, after the turmoil of the ongoing financial crisis it has been investigated by several other authors including, notably, the model of (Shin, 2008) which builds on the one of (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001 ). In our model the bankruptcy cascade mechanism is activated only in case of bankruptcy of one or more agents in the system, as opposed to the distress propagation effect which is at work at every time. In order to capture this effect and investigate its implications, we need to introduce a discrete cascading process. For the sake of simplicity we assume that this process is much faster than the evolution of robustness described by Equation (6), so that we can decouple the two processes. In other words, in case one or more bankruptcies occur at time t, then the following recursive process takes place in the interval [t, t + dt], for all i. We denote the time scale of the cascade process with the discrete variable τ = 1, ..., n τ and we introduce a temporary variableρ i (τ ). At each time step τ , the variables of all agents are updated in parallel.
The function χ j (τ ) simply indicates if the agent j has gone bankrupt at any of the steps 1, ..., τ . Equation (11) simply states that the bankruptcy of one or more borrowers of i leads to a reduction of agent i's robustness. The extent of such reduction could be modelled in other ways. Here we chose a simple one: if the agent in turn goes bankrupt, then the robustness of its lenders will go down too.
The parameter a determines the extent of the damage caused by the bankruptcy of j to the neighbors as a whole. In particular, the damage transferred to agent i depends on the ratio a k because agent j is one out of k neighbors and the dependence is evenly allocated.
The cascading process ends after a finite number of steps smaller than the number of agents. Notice that if the network has small world properties (?, page 54), the number of steps is of order of log(N ) and therefore very small (for instance 3 for N=1000). In the final state, a certain fraction s of the agents are bankrupt.
Notice that while the trend reinforcement effect h depends on i itself, here the externality on i resulting from the bankruptcy of j depends only on the weight that j had for i's business and on the capability of agent i to recover part of the debt of j.
When we add cascades to our model, there results an interplay between the law of motion (8) and the cascade process. The distribution of robustness affects the cascades, and these in turn reshape the distribution of robustness. Since the cascade is a discrete process involving recursively the neighbors of higher order of the nodes that initially fail, it is not possible any longer to describe the temporal evolution of the robustness in terms of a simple stochastic process.
For the aim of evaluating systemic risk we are interested in the fraction s(t) of concurrent failures at time t including not only the agents that fail at the beginning of period t, but also those who fail because of the cascade effect. Thus systemic risk can be seen as the result of two factors: the size of the different possible cascades, and the frequency by which the system visits the distribution of robustness that lead to those cascades.
In order to evaluate the relationship between systemic risk and the density of the network, we first analyze the process of cascades alone, separated from the evolution of robustness. In this case we show that for any given initial distribution of of robustness before a cascade, one can compute, under some mild analytical approximations, the number of failures occurring during the cascade.
Finally, we show that in the presence of cascades, the probability of having a large fraction of failures in the system is non monotonically decreasing with risk diversification.
The size of a cascade
The firms who go bankrupt at the beginning of period t propagate a damage to their neighbors. Those neighbors who in turn fail, affect their own neighbors, and this process goes on recursively until it stops.
The number of failures at the end of the cascade process can be easily computed. The technique consists in deriving a self-consistent equation for the fraction of failures in the system as a function of the fraction of failures at the previous step Solving for the fix point of such equation, yields the size of the cascade. The derivation rests on the assumption that the failures of the neighbors of a given node are statistically independent, so that we can describe the probability of multiple failures among the neighbors of a node with a binomial distribution. This assumption is strictly valid only when there are few failures in the system. When there are instead many failures in the system, the cascade process will very likely involve the whole network, independently of the correlation between neighbors' failures. Therefore the computation is reasonably accurate in both cases. The result is stated in the following proposition. Notice that the fraction s includes the failures at the beginning of the period t, plus those occurring during the period t.
Proposition 2. Consider the process of Eq. 11 with time variable τ . Assume the network of firms is a generalized random graph with degree distribution p(k). The initial distribution of robustness is a gaussian p(ρ, τ = 0) = gauss(m, σ ρ ), Then, the fraction s of failures generated in the cascade process converges in finite time to the solution of the equation then s is the solution of
where Φ m,σρ is the cumulative distribution of a gaussian probability density function with mean m and variance σ 2 ρ .
For our purposes it is convenient from now on to consider σ as constant and the diversification k as a varying parameter. The dependency of s on the parameters k and m is illustrated in Figure 2 . If the initial distribution has a mean m close to 0 and a large variance (small k), then obviously many firms are initially bankrupt, when the cascade process starts. They affect other firms, many of which have also small robustness since the mean of the distribution is low and the variance large. On the contrary, if the distribution has very small variance (large k), such that very few firms are bankrupt at the beginning and only few others are weak enough to fail through the cascade effect, then the cascade stops quickly.
Interplay of Robustness Evolution and Cascades. Implications of Systemic Risk
From Equation ?? and Figure 2 , we learn that there are basically two regimes, one with small cascades and one with large cascades. In the regime of small cascades, at each time step the number of failures is close to the average number of failures P f we found in Section ??. There are small fluctuations around this number and each failure is not causing other failures. In other words, p(m, k) ∼ 1 for s(m, k) = P f (k) and p(m, k) ∼ 0 otherwise. In contrast, in the regime of large cascades, no failures occur for many time steps, while the robustness decreases steadily in the whole system. When a node hits the threshold this triggers a large cascade. In this regime the fluctuations of the fraction of failed nodes are obviously much larger. In order to provide some quantitative estimate of the probability of large cascades, in this regime, we approximate the probability p(m, k) that a distribution of robustness with mean m and variance σ 2 /k is realized, with the inverse of the expected time it takes for a trajectory to reach the value m for the first time. In other words p(m, k) ∼ 1/T (m, k). By means of this approximation we can then compute explicitly the probability P
. The dependence on the degree k can obtained by numerically integrating the expression P
The result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider the process of Eq. 11 with time variable τ . Assume the initial distribution of robustness is a gaussian p(ρ, τ = 0) = gauss(m, σ). Assume the network of firms is a regular graph with degree k. Further assume the following analytical approximation:
where c = .25. Then, the probability of large cascades P L f is a non monotonic function of σ.
As shown by the plot in figure 3 , the probability of large cascades is not decreasing monotonically with k. On the contrary it exhibit a marked minimum for intermediate values of k.
[ Corollary 1 (Non monotonicity of systemic risk). In presence of trend reinforcement and cascade effect, increasing risk diversification k in the credit network does not imply that the systemic risk decreases monotonically. In particular, the systemic risk indicator R γ may have local minima and/or local maxima.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have characterized the evolution over time of a credit network in the most general terms as a system of coupled Ito processes, each one of which describes the dynamics of individual financial robustness The coupling comes from the connectivity of the network, since each agents' financial robustness is associated with the financial robustness of the partners through risk sharing, distress propagation and the bankruptcy cascade effects. We find that in the presence of trend reinforcement, the positive feedback of financial robustness on itself, together with the other externalities represented by distress propagation and bankruptcy cascade may more than offset the stabilizing role of risk sharing and amplify the effects of a shock to a single node of the network, leading to a full fledged systemic crisis.
In particular, we show that when only risk sharing and distress propagation are present, the shock is absorbed and goes to zero as connectivity increases. In other words, as expected, distress propagation per se, therefore, does not offset the benign effect of risk sharing.
Adding trend reinforcement to the picture modifies radically the conclusion. In this case the relationship between the probability of failure and connectivity is U-shaped. The stabilizing role of risk diversification prevails only when connectivity is low. If connectivity is already high, a further increase may have the perverse effect of amplifying the shock due to distress propagation and trend reinforcement. The situation is even more complicated if one takes into account also the bankruptcy cascade effect. In this case, the relationship between systemic risk and connectivity may present multiple local maxima and minima.
The present work is intended to provide a basic generic model and can be extended in several directions. For instance, one can study the effect of different static topological structures in the credit network, such as skewed degree distributions or degree-degree correlation (assortativity). These have been found to have prominent effects in spreading phenomena akin to technological diffusion on social networks (Jackson and Rogers, 2007) . A specific and major question in our context concerns the systemic risk of a network organized in clusters which are densely connected inside but loosely connected among each other. Whether there exists an optimal level of clusterization would have important implications on the debate about the role of globalization. In addition, one can model the set of contracts among agents as an endogenously evolving network in which each agent may rewire some of her ties to the other agents if she expects to derive a higher utility or a smaller risk in doing so.
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